The Battle of Tannenberg, August 26-30, 1914 was between Russian and German troops during the East Prussian operation in the First World War.
The Schlieffen plan, which was the basis of the German strategy to win in the First World War, was created from the assumption that the Russian army would delay deployment for necessary mobilization. It was assumed that during this time the German army would be able to inflict heavy casualties in France and capture Paris, and then attack Russia. However, the Russian army unexpectedly mobilized quickly and created an offensive on the Eastern Front, thus putting Germany in a bad position.
The Russian offensive was carried out by the forces of two armies. The 1st Army under the command of General PK Rennenkampf, and the 2nd Army, under the command of General AV Samsonov. The 8th German Army, commanded by Colonel-General Prittwitz, was defeated on August 20, in a battle near Gumbinen. In the flank and rear, was the 2nd army of Samsonov. As a result, Prittwitz, fearful of encirclement, decided to retreat and abandon the entire territory of East Prussia.
The course of the battle
The defeat at Gumbinnen created a real threat of encirclement of the Eighth German Army, and on the evening of August 20, Prittwitz decided to retreat. However, this decision was opposed and, contrary to the plan of Schlieffen, who, due to the unfavorable development of events on the Eastern Front, demanded a retreat to the heartland of Germany; but in no case withdraw troops from the Western Front, in order to assure the defeat France and avoid a war on two fronts.
On August 21, Moltke removed Prittwitz and his chief of staff, General Waldersee, and appointed Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von Ludendorff in their place. They arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Army on August 23,and approved a plan to repel the Russian offensive against East Prussia. It was decided to deploy 2.5 divisions against the 1st Russian army along the railway through Koenigsberg, and to transfer the main forces of the 8th Army against the 2nd Russian army of Samsonov and try to defeat it before it merged with units of the First Army. However, the implementation of the plan entirely depended on the actions of the Rennenkampf army, whose rapid advance to the west, according to Ludendorff, would make the maneuver unthinkable.
At this time, the command of the North-Western Russian Front discovered a rapid retreat of German troops. They thought that the Germans were retiring beyond the Vistula, and considered the military operation to be completed, and changed the initial plan.
The main forces of the First Rennenkampf Army were not directed toward the Second Army of Samsonov, but on the intersecting of city of Koenigsberg, where part of the 8th German Army was allegedly concealed under the assumption of an offensive. The Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army, Samsonov, in turn, decided to intercept the retreat of Germans, and insisted before the command of the front on transferring the main contingent of his army from the north to the north-west direction, which led to the Russian armies advancing in different directions; and between them a huge gap formed. The command of the Russian Army also considered the operation in East Prussia basically complete and worked on an offensive plan to take the interior of Germany.
The new command of the 8th German Army decided to take advantage of the gap formed between the Russian armies to inflict flanking blows on the 2nd Samsonov army, encircle it and destroy it.
The defeat of the Russian army
The main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Army were completely unsatisfactory command from the headquarters of the North-Western Front, who failed to correctly assess the operational situation in the period of August 20-26, as well as the mistakes of army commander General Samsonov, who unreasonably widened the army’s offensive line, and failed to provide operational control of army units during the ensuing battle. Russian army intelligence failed to disclose the concentration of the main forces of the 8th German Army against the flanks of the Samsonov Army. This was caused by complete disdain for procedure in the headquarters of the 2nd Russian Army; and failure of front-line radio communications in the Russian chain of command. The day before the offensive, the Germans intercepted the messages of the Russian headquarters, transmitted in plain language to one of the corps with a detailed position of the army’s forces, and an indication of its’ immediate plans, which immediately affected the position of Hindenburg’s troops.
Conclusion
The great German Victory and complete destruction of the Russian Army lead to bittersweet consequences. Russian General Samsonov committed suicide; and most of his army lay dead on the battlefield. This tragic event for the Russians was one of the triggers for the Great Revolution, and it showed the divide between aristocratic officers and the people and soldiers. The German General Hindenburg became a legendary savior of Germany. This battle made it clear that this war was going to be like no other. And the casualties were going to be enormous.
However, the desire of the German leadership to keep East Prussia at all costs, even at the expense of the transfer of troops from the Western Front, resulted in the failure of the operations against France, and thus the strategic defeat of Germany. Germany was forced to conduct a war on two fronts. The ambition of German politicians to symbolically tie the battle of Tannenberg to the Battle of Grunwald, which took place 500 years earlier, led to the creation of a large Tannenberg memorial containing the grave of General and President Hindenburg.
This battle is considered crucial to the outcome of the war. Because if the Russian army had failed to engage the German Army, the French would probably have fallen, and the war would probably have gone to the Germans.
Sources:
- Solzhenitsyn AI Red Wheel
- Romanov P. Rus. Part IV
- Novikov A. Fighting feats of simpletons
- Pikul V. I have the honor
